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IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION AS REDISTRIBUTIVE
TAXATION: WORKING WOMEN AND THE COSTS OF
PROTECTIONISM IN THE LABOR MARKET
Howard F. Chang"
ABSTRACT
In this article, I argue that tax and transfer policies are more efficient
than immigration restrictions as instruments for raising the after-tax in-
comes of the least skilled native workers. Policies to protect these native
workers from immigrant competition in the labor market are no better at
promoting distributive justice and are likely to impose a greater economic
burden on natives in the country of immigration than the tax alternative.
These immigration restrictions are especially costly given the dispropor-
tionate burden that they place on households with working women, a bur-
den that discourages female participation in the labor force. This burden
runs contrary to the teachings of optimal tax theory and introduces excc~­
sive distortions in the labor market because the supply of female labor is
more elastic than the supply of male labor. Thus, the best response to con-
cerns about the effect of immigration on the distribution of income among
natives is to increase the progressivity of the tax system.
* Earle Hepburn Professor of Law, University of Pcnnsylvnnia L.1W School. Copyright @ 2009
by Howard F. Chang. This article is based on a previously published article by Howard F. Chang. TIle
DisadvQfIlages of ImmigfCltio" RestriClion as a Policy to ImprOlle Income Djstrib"rimt. 61 SMU L. REV.
23 (2008). Reprinted with permission from the SMU Lnw Review and the Southem Methodist Univer-
sity Dedman School of Law, I would like 10 thank Daniel Griswold, Gilli,ul Hadfield, Jacob Hornber-
ger, Henrik Lando. Matthew Lister. Edward McCaffery. Chris Sanchirico. David Weisbach, symposium
participanls at George Mason University. conference panicipants at lhe 2008 meeting of Lhe American
Law and Economics Association al Columbia University, and seminar panicipants at the Universily of
Chicago, Boston University, and Loyola Marymount University for helpful comments.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1141165




II. The Economjc Impact of International Labor Migration S
A. The Gains from International Trade in the Labor Markcl.. 6
B. Income Distribution Among Natives 8
III. Protectionism and Distributive Justice 11
A. The Double Distortion 13
B. Heterogeneous Individuals 14
J. Equity 15
2. Economic Efficiency and Intcracting Distortions 16
a. Optimal Tax Theory and Working Women 16
b. Immigration Restrictions and Working Women 17
c. Immigration Restrictions Versus the Tax Alternative 23
fY. Conclusion 27
I. INTRODUCTION
To an economist, the international migration of workers is one facet of
globalization, which economists understand to mcan the development of a
global common market, that is, our evolution toward a world economy that
i integrated across national boundaries. Our progress in this direction has
been especially dramatic in the liberalization of international trade in goods.
Economists generally welcome this development, prescribing free trade as
the regime that maximizes global economic welfare. Economists also rec-
ommcnd liberalized trade as a policy that is likely to produce gains for each
national economy.
Economists also recognize that the same theory that appl ie. Lo goods
also applies to international trade in other market. Nations can gain
through not only the free movement of goods across national boundaries
but also the free movement of labor across national boundaries. I The basic
intuition for this result derives from the gains from international trade in the
labor market. We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage countries
to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a result of this mi-
1 See Howard F. Chang. Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Ec:o'lOm;c Welfare and the
Oprimnllmmigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1147. 1148-50 (1997).
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gration, world output rises. Higher wages in the host country imply that the
marginal product of labor is higher there than in the source country. In
other words, higher wages for the same worker mean that the worker pro-
duces more value in the host country than in the source country. Labor
migration generally leads to net gains in global wealth because labor nows
to the country where it has the higher-value use.2 For this reason, economic
theory raise a presumption in favor of the free movement of labor. Migra-
tion restrictions distort the global labor market, producing a misallocation
of labor among countries, thereby wasting human resources and creating
unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant countries.
Despite these considerations, many observers favor immigration re-
striction as a policy designed to protect native workers from foreign compe-
tition] In the United States, these protectionists claim that the entry of im-
migrant workers ha increased income inequality among natives substan-
tially.' Pr tectionists concerned about distributive justice among citizens
often infer that we should restrict immigration insofar as the entry of alien
workers cau 'es such an increase in income inequality among natives.s In
this article, I will focus on this concern regarding income inequality in par-
ticular, setting aside the other reasons that restrictionists may have for op-
posing more liberal immigration policies.
Concerns for the labor market prospects of the least skilled natives ill
the United States lead protectionist to urge restrictions on the immigration
of the least skilled immigrant worker in particular.6 The economist George
2 See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFEI..D, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
POLICY 158-59 (2d ed. \99\).
3 See, e.g .. Steven A. Camarota, Immigront Employment Gains and Native Losses, 2000·2004, in
DEOATING IMMIGRATION 139. 156 (Carol M. Swain cd.. 2007) (presenting evidence that "immigrJtion
has advc~~ly impacted natives" and concluding lhat "reducing the levels of immigration may be helpful
for the job prospects of native-bom Americans"),
4 See, e.g.. GEORGE ]. BORJAS, HEt\VEN'S DoOR: IMMIGRATION POLley AND THE AMERICAN
EcONO:VIY 99 (1999) (claiming that immigration ;'transfers a substantial amount of wcahh away from
thl;' workers who compete with immigrants to the nJtives who have skills or physical resources that
benefit from the presence of immigrants" and tllilt "it is the lesswskilled natives who pay the price of
immigration"): Peter Brimclow, Eeot/omies of lmmigrarion clIld the Course olthe Debare Since 1994,;t/
DEDATI 'G IMMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 157, 158, 164 (claiming that "imrnignu..ian docs C<lUSC a
substantial redistribution of income among the native·bom" such !.hal "it is distributcd among a diminw
ishil1g number of the nativcwborn at thc expense of their fellow countrymen"),
5 See. e,g., Stephen Macedo, nit! Moral Dilemma of u.s. Immigrarion Polic:y: Open Borders
Versus Social Just jet?, in DEBATll'\G l\tMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 63, 64, 68 (worrying that Iibcr.tl
immigration policies "involve injustice toward poorer native-born Americans" and arguing that "if high
levels of immigration have a detrimenlal impact on our least wcllwoff fellow citizen~, [hal is a re<lson to
limit immigration").
6 See. e.g.• BORJAS, supra note 4, at 17 (assuming that lhe United States "does nOI want immigra.
lion to greatly increase the amount of inequality in the society" .md concluding that Ihe evidence sup-
ports "a strong case that thc United States would be better off by adopting an immigration policy thal
favored skilled workers"): VERNON M. BRIGGS. JR.. MASS IMMIGRATION AND THE NATIONAL ~ITEREST
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Borjas, for example, propose' that the United States adopt a "point ystem"
to select skilled workers for admission 7 In fact, when the U.S. Senate con-
sidered comprehensive immigration reform in 2007, the bill at the center of
those deliberations wouJd have replaced exi ting employment-based admis-
sions and some family-sponsored immigration with such a point system.s
[n this artiele, however, I suggest that proposals to reduce relatively
unskilled immigration are inappropriate responses to concerns about the
distribution of income among natives. I argue that the appropriate response
to these concerns would be to increa'e the progressivity of our tax system
rather than to restrict the entry of relatively unskilled alien workers. In Part
II of this article, I briefly ummarize the literature on the economic effects
of labor migration, including some recent estimates of the magnitude of
these effects9 [n particular, this review focuses on the effects that migra-
tion produces for participants in national labor markets, assuming that fiscal
policies do not change the distribution of costs and benefits among indi-
viduals. This background information lays the foundation for the analysis
that follows in Part HI of thi article. which introduces the option of redis-
tribution through the public sector and focuses on a comparison of immi-
gration restrictions with a set of tax reforms that has the same expected
impact on the distribution of income among natives.
This comparison evaluates policy alternatives in terms of the economic
welfare of natives alone. I assume a strictly nativist measure of national
economic welfarc, not because I believe that immigration policy should be
guided solely by the interests of natives, but because their interests have in
fact played a dominant role in the public debate over immigration policy.
BOljas adopts this nativist perspective, for example, when he builds his case
for tighter restrictions on the immigration of relatively unskilled alien
worker,,10 noting that "many participants in the immigration debate" as-
sume that "the United States should be concerned only with the economic
well-being of the native population.""
Thus, r adopt this perspective for the sake of argument, not because [
believe that it is morally defensible, but becau e this nativist welfare objec-
tive is commonly thought by influential protectionists to provide a strong
247 (1992) (:lrglling that "[wlith job proSPCCH:; for unskill..:d and semiskilled workers becoming dimmer"
in the United Sl(ttes, "lljegClI entry should be restricted to skilled and cdUC~Hed immigrants").
7 BORJAS. .'iIl/Jl'{/ note 4. al 192-94.
8 See S. 1639. tlOth Congo § 502 (2007): THO~IAS ALEXA,] DER ALEL~IKO'" ET AL..
IMMIGRATI N MOD CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 460-62 (6th cd. 2(08).
9 For a more comprehensive survey of the empirical litermure, see Howard F. Chang, The Eco-
/lomic Impact of Itltemariol/t11 Labor Migratio,,: Recent Estimates oml Polic.\ ImplicotiOlu', 16 TEMP,
POL. &CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321 (2007).
10 BORJAS, SUp"l note 4, at l7 (assuming lhat "the goal of immigration policy is , , . to maximjze
the economic well-being of thc naliv~ population," which "depends bOlh on per capita income and on
the distribution of income in lhe nalive popuhHion").
II /<1. '" 182.
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case in favor of immigration restriction. My goal in this article is to take
the objective commonly adopted by protectionists like Borjas and to argue
that, even if we take this objective seriously, it does not suppor! the restric-
tionist conclusions they seek to derive. With this goal in mind, r adopt his
assumption that we seek "to maximize the economic well-being of the na-
tive population," defined as a measure of social welfare that "depends both
on per capita income and on the distribution of income in the native popula-
lion.ul2
My analysis suggests that even from this narrow per. pective, which
"stacks the deck" against the immigrant, immigration restrictions that pro-
tect the least skilled native workers from foreign competition are a costly
response to concerns about income distribution. These restrictions are es-
pecially costly given the disproportionate burden they place on households
with working women, a burden which discourages female participation in
the labor force. A the supply of female labor is more elastic than the sup-
ply of male labor, the burdcn that immigration re ·trictions impose on work-
ing women runs contrary to the teachings of optimal lax theory and intro-
duces excessive distortions in the labor market. J conclude that progressive
tax reforms would be more emcient than immigration re trictions a in-
struments for raising the after-tax incomes of the lea t skilled native work-
13ers.
In Part IV, I discuss the normative implicalions of my economic analy-
sis. I relax the assumption that our sole concern is the welfare of natives
and address the welfare of immigrants and of aliens outside of the Unitcd
States. r conclude that protectionist immigration policies are not only likely
to be relatively costly as an instrument for redistribution among natives but
also perverse from the standpoint of global justice. Thus, considerations of
economic efficiency and distributive justice both militate against immigra-
tion restrictions.
11. THE ECONOMI IMPACT OF lNTERNATJONAL LABOR MIGRATION
To evaluate the use of immigration restrictions to achieve a desirable
distribution of income, we must first understand both thc economic costs
that these restrictions impose and the bcnefits they generate for ome work-
12 1<1.0117.
13 TIlese progressive fiscal policics would also compensate 1I13ny n31ive workers who may be
harmed by liberalized immigration policies. I do not. however. lake compcnsalion to be the goa: of
these policics. Inslead. I take al face value the claims of prmcctionisls who express COnccrn~ nboul
income in~uaJilY among natives and argue ogainst immigration restriclions within lhtlt framework of
distributive justice. Progressive fiscal policic!; nevcnhelcss may as an incidental matter compensate
nalive workers for thc adverse effccts of libcmlized immigl'Ulion. If these progressive reroons are
explicitly linked to libcralil.t:d immigration, then the prospect of compensalion may also reduce the
political opposition to liberalization.
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ers. Therefore, I begin my analysis of immigration restriction. with a re-
view of the impact of labor migration on the private sector, setting aside the
impact immigrants may have on the public sector. For the time being, I will
assume that fi cal policies do not offset the effects in the labor market by
shifting costs and benefits among individuals in the country of immigration.
Later, in Part TIl of this article, I will introduce the possibility of redistribu-
tion through the public sector.
First, T review some of the latest estimates of the magnitude of the
gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing international migration.
These estimates indicate that even partial liberalization would not only pro-
duce substantial increases in the world's real income but also improve its
distribution by reducing international inequality. Second, I tum to the ques-
tion of the effects of immigration on the distribution of income among na-
tives in the United States. In particular, I review recent estimates of the
impact of immigration on the least skilled native workers. I suggest that,
under a fair reading of this economic literature, the best evidence available
indicates that the adverse effect of immigration on the least skilled native
workers is small.
A. The Gainsfrom International Trade ill the Labor Market
The larger the inequality in wages between countries, the larger the
distortion of global labor markets causcd by migration restri<;tions, and the
larger the economic gains from liberalizing labor migration. Given the de-
gree of wage inequality in the world today,I4 it should be apparent that the
gains from liberalized migration are huge. In fact, ome economists have
attempted to estimate the gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing
migration.
The World Bank, for example, has recently studied the potential gains
from a modest increase in international migration. IS The World Bank
economists considered the cffects of an increase in migration from "devel-
oping" countries to "high-income countries" sufficient to increase the labor
force in the host countries by 3% by the year 2025. 16 They concluded that
this scenario "would generate large increases in global welfare,'·17 increas-
ing the world's real income by $356 billion in 2025. 18 The gains from lib-
14 See Mexican Deportees Repon Good Treatmelll. United Press Intcmational. Apr. 21, 1996.
available at LexisNexis Library. UP.! File (reporting the results of a survey of dCPOl1Cd Mexicun immi-
grants. who received an average of $278 per week in the United States. compared wilh 530.81 per week
in Mexico).
15 See WORLD BANK. GLOBAL EcoNOMIC PROSPEcrS 2006: ECONOMIC L"PLICATIONS OF
REMmANCES AND MIGRATION (2006).
16 Id.•t 25.
17 Id.•t 26.
18 See id"1 31.
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See id. at 138-39.
See WORl.D BANK, supra note IS. at 34.
See id. at 33-34.
eralization would be distributed such thaT if we examine the effects on na-
Tives in the countries of immigration, on the migrants, and on those left
behind in the countries of emigraTion, we find That each group would enjoy
significant gains. Furthermore, "the relative gains are much higher for de-
veloping-country households than high-income country households.,,19
Thus, liberalization would not only increase the world's real income but
al 0 reduce international income inequality.
FirsT consider The effects of immigranT workers on naTives in the coun-
try of immigraTion. If we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor
market, we find That the naTives of The hOST counTry, taken together, will
gain from The immigration of labor.2o Wages may fall for native workers
who compete with immigranT labor, bUT This loss for workers is a pure trans-
fer among natives: it is offset by an equal gain for those who employ labor
and ultimately for consumers who obtain goods and services at lower COSt.21
Furthermore, natives gain from employing immigrant workers: They gain
surplus in excess of whaT They pay immigranTs for Their labor. Thus, naTives
as a group enjoy a neT gain from employing immigranTs. In facT, the World
Bank economisTs estimate thaT the high-income countries receiving immi-
grants in Their liberalization scenario would enjoy an increase of $139 bil-
lion in their real income.22
In theory, migraTion may make Those left behind in The source coun-
Tries worse off insofar as They no longer enjoy The gains from Trade That they
used TO enjoy from employing the workers who have emigraTed. AlThough
workers left behind would enjoy an increase in wages as a result of (he de-
parture of compeTing workers, employers would lose more than The workers
left behind would gain. As long as The migranTS allowed to move under the
liberalization analyzed by the World Bank send the same proportion of their
income to Those left behind as that sent by existing migranTs, however, (he
World Bank estimaTes that wiTh these remittances, those left behind would
enjoy a gain of $143 billion23
It is the migrants themselves, however, who gain by far The most from
Their own migraTion. They obTain much higher wages in Their hOST countries
Than They did in their source countries. In the scenario analyzed by (he
World Bank, The additional migrants allowed TO move under liberalized
immigration policies nearly tripled their own real income on average, en-
joying a gain of $162 billion, even after subtracting remiTtances sent back (0
19 Jd. at 35.
20 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COliNCIL. TJ-IE NEW AMeRICANS: EcONOMIC. DEMOCR,\J>HIC. AKD
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those left behind in their countries of origin.24 In this scnse, labor migration
represents a form of international trade in which the source country exports
labor to the host country. Like international trade in goods, labor migration
allows foreign suppliers to sell their services to domestic buyers, allowing
both parties to gain from trade.
B. Income Distribution Among Natives
Nevertheless, countries often restrict immigration to protect native
workers from the uncmployment or the wage reductions that the entry of
foreign workers would supposedly entail. In this sense, immigration barri-
ers, like trade barriers, are protectionist: they are designed to protect na-
tives from foreign competition.25 Protectionists often defend these barriers
as policies that promote a more equal distribution of income among natives,
pointing to the adver c effects of immigration on the welfare of the least
skilled native workers in particular. Although the economic effects of im-
migration on native workers and distributive justice are often advanced as
reasons to reduce immigration, these concerns for distributive justice do not
provide a sound justification for restrictive immigration laws.
First, concerns regarding income inequality among natives do not jus-
tify any restrictions on skilled immigration because skilled immigrants not
only increase total wealth for natives but also promote a more equitable
distribution of income among natives.26 Skilled immigrants arc likely to
have an adverse effect only on competing skilled natives and increase the
real wages of everyone else, including less skilled natives, who enjoy the
benefits of a greater supply of skilled labor. Therefore, the pursuit of a
more equal distribution of income among natives would at most justify
concerns regarding relatively unskilled imrnigration, which could have an
adverse effect on the real wages of relatively unskilled native workers.27
24 Su id. at 34-35. This gain of $143 billion would represent an increase of migrants' real income
by 199%. Id. "' 38.
25 In the United States, we have designed some of OUf immigration restriction explicitly in terms
of this objective. For example. we require "labor ccrtificmi 11" for mOst categories of employment·
based immigration visas. including c:vc:n those for skilled workers holding advanced degrees. See 8
U.S.C. §§ I I53(b)(2)·(3). I I82(a)(5XD) (2000). Labor .eniD.ation requires lhe employer shnw lhat
"there are nOt sufficicnI workers who arc able. willing, qualified . .. and available" to perform the work:
in question and that the cmploymcni of the alien "will nOt adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of workers in lhe United SlateS similarly employed." Id. § I I82(a)(5)(A)(I), (II). We also
impose quantitative restrictions on immigration visas. in part, to protect nalive workers from foreign
competition. See id. §§ 1151·1153.
26 See Howard F. Chang. Immigration and rile Workplace: {mmigrorion Restrictions a.Ii Employ"
l1Ielll Discrimination. 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291.308-09 (2003).
27 Few relatively unskilled workers can obtain employment-based immigration visas 10 enter the
United States: of the J40.000 visas allocated to employment-based immigration per year, only 10.000
may go 10 relalively unskilled workers. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (d)(1 )(A), I I53(b)(3)(A)(iii), (B) (2000).
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Second, studies of the effects of inunigration in labor markets in the
United States and in other countries have shown little evidence of any sig-
nificant effects on native wages or employment, even for the lea t killed
native workers.28 Given the small effect of immigration on native wages
and employment, protectionist policies seem particularly misguided. David
Card's influential study of the effect of the Mariel Cubans on the Miami
labor market, for example, produces fairly typical results for this literature:
he found that the arrival of 125,000 Cubans in 1980, which increased the
supply of labor in Miami by 7% almost overnight, had virtually no effect on
the wage and employment opportunities for workers in Miami, including
the lea t skilled whites and the least skilled blacks29
Why do immigrants have so little advel' e impact on the wages and
employment of natives? One reason is that the demand for labor does not
remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immigrant workers not
only supply labor but also demand goods and services. This demand trans-
lates into greater demand for locally supplied labor. Furthermore, an influx
of labor will create a profit opportunity for investors, which in turn will
attract capital to the economic activities employing the immigrant labor.
This expansion in the sector of the economy employing this labor will also
increase the demand for that labor, which in tum would tend to offset the
effect of increased supply.3o
Finally, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants and natives
are not perfect substitutes in the labor market. so they orten do not compete
for the same jobs.31 For example, immigrants are likely to have different
language skills than natives do. Therefore, employers may find natives to
be better suited than immigrants are for some tasks. In fact, labor markets
are highly segregated, with immigrant labor concentrated in somc occupa-
tions and natives concentrated in others.J2 Immigrants compete with one
28 See George J. Borjas. Tile Economics oj Immigration, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1667. 1697-98
(1994); Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt, The Impact of Immigrams 011 Host CO/lntry Wages.
EmploymcfII alld Crowrh. J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995. at 42; NRC. supra note 20. at 223. Estimatcs
of these effects are small, whether we consider thl: c;lTcCI on native wages. native uncmploymcnl rall:s.
01' native participation in the labor force. See hi. at 222.
29 See D;IVid Card. The Impact 0/ the Mariel !Jumlijr 011 the j\llia",; uloor /Harket, 43 INDUS. &
LAll. REL. REV. 245. 256 (1990).
30 Thus, by shifting resources to the sectors of the economy cmploying immigrJ,nts, an economy
can mitigatc or even eliminate the advcrse effects that immigrant workers may have on the wages of
competing native workers. See Noel Gnston & Douglas Nelson. Imm;grm;oll and u,bour·A'/arket Ow-
comes in the United States: A Politica/·£coflomy Pilule. 16 OXFORD REV, EeON. POL'Y 104. 108
(2000) (noting thal "some of the adjustment . .. will occur via a Change in the output mix. reducing the,
. .costS to the competing factor (Le. domestic unskHled labour)").
31 See Jean Baldwin Grossman. The Substitutability 0/ Natives and Immigrants i" Production. 64
REV. ECON. & STAT. 596 (1982).
32 See NRC, sIlpra note 20, at 218 (concluding that the data suggest rnat "the jobs of immigrant
and native workers are different").
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another far more than they compete with natives]3 Indeed, some immigrant
labor can be a complement rather than a sub titute for native labor so that
an increase in the supply of immigrant labor will increase the demand for
native labor and thus have positive effects on native wages.
Nevertheless, some economists claim that immigration has a signifi-
cant adverse impact on the least skilled native workers?4 It is important,
however, to interpret these claims carefully in light of the po itive effects of
immigration on the demand for native labor. Recent work by George Bor-
jas, in particular, is widely cited by restrictionists for his large estimates of
the effect of immigrants on native wages.35 In a recent study, for example,
he attempts to estimate the effects of all immigration between 1980 and
2000 on native workers in the United States, concluding that the large in-
flux of workers over these two decades reduced the wage of the average
native worker by 3.2% and the wage of high-school dropouts by 8.9% dur-
ing this period.36 These results. however, are based on a simulation that
makes two extreme a sumptions. First, he assumes that immigrants are
perfect substitutes for natives as long as the workers have the same number
of years of education and of experience.37 Second, he assumes that the
capital stock is fixed and does not respond to this immigration by increasing
the supply of capital to the economic activities employing immigrant la-
bor.3K Given these restrictive assumptions, his simulation is inherently bi-
ased in favor of finding large adverse effects on natives.J9
33 Thus. immigrnlion docs have a more SubslOlolial :ulvcrsc effect on thc wages of other immi-
grams. who are much closer substitutes for new immigrants. See id. at 223 ("The onc group !.hat appears
10 suffer significant negative cffcClS from new immigrmHs arc earlier waves of immigrants, according to
many studies.").
34 99See. e.g.• BORJAS. supra note 4, at .
35 See Brimclow. wpm notc 4, at 164 (ciling Borjas); Macedo. supra nOle 5. at 66 (siHnc); Carol
M, Swain. Tile COflgres.I'iof/(rl Black Caucus and the Impact of IlIlmigmtiOIl on African A1IIl!rictUl UII'
empioymcllf, ill DEIl,\TJ""'O IMMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 175, 182, 185 (same).
36 See George J. BOI:ias, Tire lAbor Demand Curve Is Dow/lward Slopi"g: Ree,wu"illillg the Im-
poet of Immigratio" 0" 'he ulbor Marker. 118 Q.J. ECON. 1335. 1368 (2003),
37 See it!. at 1360 (assuming un "aggregate producLion function for the nationul economy" that
draws no distinction between nalive workers and immigrant workers),
38 See id. at 1368 ("(ajssuming that lhe capilal stock is constant").
39 In a more rcccni simul~lion George Borjas and Lawrenc...: K31Z all w the capilal slock 10 adjust
and produce much bener results for native workers. See Gcorg~ J. Borj:I." & Lawrence F. KaL:7... The
Evolution of the Mexi<'llll-Bom Workforce in tire U"ired Suites 39 (NuI'1 Bureau of Econ. Research.
Working Paper No.1 1281. 2005), Afler the capitJI mnrkl;;[ adjusts to the inOu:< of irnmignJnts hetween
1980 and 2000, (he wage of the average worker rises slightly, and the wages of high-school dropouls
falls by only ~.8%. See iti, al 39-40. 63. Borjas and Kmz have since reduced lheir estimate of Ihis
adverse effect on the wages of high·school dropouts down to 3.6%. "acknowledging Lhat the original
analysis used some statistically flimsy data." Eduardo Porter, CO.\'r of Illegal Immigrariofl IHay Oe Less
ThOr! Meets rhe Eye. N, Y, TIMES. Apr. 16.2006, § 3. al 3. This "small impact, .. was likely swamped
by all the other things that hit the economy," including "the revolution in technology." /d. Furthermore.
all of these simul:ltions mainLa.in the resLrictive assumption that immip,rlJnts and natives are perfeci
substitutes within each class of labor.
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A more recent study by Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri uses a
simulation that instead allows the supply of capital to adjust and allows
immigrants and natives with the same number of years of education and
experience to be imperfect substitutes.4o By relaxing the restrictive assump-
tions used by Borjas, they produce dramatically different results. Once they
allow the capital slock 10 adjust fully, they estimate that all immigration
into the United States from 1990 to 2004 increased the average wage of
native workers by l.8% and decreased the wage of native high-school
dropouts by only 1.1 %.'1 Indeed, they find that all native workers with at
least a high-school education enjoy increased wages as a result of this im-
migration rather than reduced wages. Thus, this influx of immigrants had
only a small adverse effect on the shrinking minority of native workers with
less than a high-school education.'2
III. PROTECTIONISM AND DISTRrBUTIVE JUSTICE
On the other hand, even if present levels of immigration have little ef-
fect on the wages of the least skilled natives, a more liberal immigration
policy might produce more significant effects, especially if relatively un-
skilled workers were to make up an increasingly large fraction of the flow
of immigrants. Indeed, restrictionists often cite the need to protect the least
skilled native workers from relatively unskilled immigrant competition in
the labor market. Like trade barriers, however, immigration barriers sacri-
fice gains from trade and thus reduce the IOtal wealth of natives as a group.
[n this sense, protectionism is a costly way to redistribute wealth from some
natives to other .
This observation brings me to my main thesis: we could redistribute
the same wealth through tax policies and transfer programs rather than
through protectionism and probably would thereby make all classes of na-
tives better off than they are under restrictive immigration policie. because
40 See Gi~nmarco I.P. Otl.:lviano & Giovanni Peri, Relhi"ki'lg tire Effects of Immigration 011 Wages
3-4 (Nat'l Hureau of teOll, Research, Working Paper No. 12497.20(6).
41 See id. ill 4. Th~!'c results ;Jrc based on their median estimate for the "elasticity of substitution"
between immigrants and n<llivcs. See id. 31 18,45 (Table 7). Onavi:lno :md Peri repon the results of 40
different regressions estimating this elasticity. and these resullS arc uniformly inconsistent with the null
hypothesis of perfect substitution. See id. at 41-12. Bitt see George. j. Borjas el al.. Immigrlltioll and
Africall-!\U/f:ricaJi Employmen( OpPo"(lUlitie~': The Response of Was(~s. £mploynll!llt. (JfI(J Incarcenltion
10 Lobor Supply Shocks II (Na,'1 Bureau of teon, Research, Working Paper No. 12518. 2(07) (,esting
the hypothesis thai immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes and finding "no evidence to support
the hypothc..';;is that immigrants and natives arc imperfect subslitutes").
42 See BORJAS. supra nNe 4. a' 27 (noting lIlal "by 1998. onty 9 % of natives lacked a high school
diploma" and showing how this percentage dccUned steadily over the preceding four decades); NRC.
supra n"te 20. at 228 (nOting lIlat "[b]y 1995. high school dropouts reprcsent<d less lIlan 10 % of the
American workforce" and were "a declining group of American workers").
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immigration produces net gains for natives as a group.43 Thus, concerns
about the distribution of income among natives do not imply that protec-
tionist imrrtigration restrictions are in order. Instead, the appropriate re-
sponse to these concerns i redistribution through progressive reforms of
tax and transfer pol icies.
Tn the United States, for example, we could make Social Security and
income taxes more progressive or increase the earned income tax credit and
liberalize it eligibility requirements. These progressive tax reforms can
supplement the income of the lea t skilled native workers if relatively un-
skilled immigration drives down their real wages. This alternative could
reduce deadweight 10 s while still redistributing the same amount of wealth
that we currently transfer through costly protectionism.
If we wish to protect relatively unskilled native workers from adverse
distributive effects, redistribution through fiscal policies is likely to be a
less costly solution than protectionism. If so, then optimal policies would
liberalize immigration in ofar as it increases the total wealth of natives. As
long as immigration increases total wealth, then those who gain from immi-
gration can compensate those who lose and still be better off. That is, those
natives who gain from an expanded demand for their own labor, capital, or
real property, or by paying lower wages to employees, or by buying prod-
ucts and services at lower cost can afford to pay enough to compensate
those who find their wages have fallen relative to prices. Through redistri-
bution, we can attempt to shift the costs of liberalized immigration to the
many beneficiaries of liberalization.
For example, if the immigration of relatively unskilled workers re-
duces th" wages of the least skilled natives, then raising taxes on those
workers with higher incomes and reducing taxes on native worker with the
lowest incomes could leave all classes of natives better off than they would
be in the absence of immigration.44 Those income classes that would pay
higher taxes to compensate the least skilled native workers are likely to bear
a still heavier burden under the protectionist alternative, which raises the
prices of goods and services for all consumers and reduces the real incomes
of more skilled natives. Protectionist policies currently impo e an implicit
tax on natives that probably costs them more than the explicit tax that
would be necessary to offset the adverse effects of liberalized immigration
policies on the least skilled native workers. Once we recognize that protec-
tionism is merely a disguised lax-and-transfer program, it should be appar-
enl that there is no good reason to favor protectionism over less costly and
more efficient transfer policies.45
43 See Chang. Slipra note 26. :H 309-11,
44 See Barry R. Chiswick., Illegal ImmigratiOIl and Immigration Control, J. ECON. PERSP.. Sum-
mer 1988. a' 101. 107.
45 Similarly. insofar as liberalized immigration were to Cause any ;ncrca.~e in unemployment
among natives, alternative policies are likely to pr ve to be more efficient responses Ihan immigration
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A. The Double Distortion
Redistribution through the tax system would produce some costly dis-
tortions in the behavior of taxpayers because income taxes reduce the in-
centives to earn income either by working or by saving and investing. The
deadweight loss of protectionism, however, is likely to be greater than the
deadweight loss from taxes with the same effect on the overall distribution
of real after-tax income. In other words, protectionism is likely to be less
efficient than the tax system in producing a desirable distribution of income
because protectionism not only produces the distortions associated with
redi tribution but also sacrifices the gains from immigration in the labor
market.
This reasoning is a specific application in the immigration context of a
claim advanced more generally by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, who
suggest that we can alway' replace an economically inefficient rule with an
efficient rule without making any income class worse off, provided that wc
make the appropriate adjustments in income taxes.46 Kaplow and Shavell
argue that "using legal rules to redistribute income distorts work incentives
fully as much as the income tax system-because the distortion is caused
by the redistribution itself-and al 0 create inefficiencies in the acti vi ties
regulated by the legal rules.,,4? In the immigration context, protectionist
re ·triction. are the inefficient legal rules, and liberalization is the efficiellt
alternative.
The "double-distortion argument" advanced by Kaplow and Shavell,
however, is subject to a number of important qllalifications.48 In particular,
restrictions. Macroeconomic fiscal policies or monetary policies. for example, could increase the de-
Ill,md for labor and restore full employment if unemployment rises above the long-run equilibrium ICVt;1
due to inadcqutllC aggregale dellland. If minimum wage laws. however, keep nOl only wngr..:s but also
unemployment above equilibrium levels. then econoll1ists would generally urge the usc of lax alternn··
lives instend of minimum wage Inws 10 incrc~lsc the "ncr-tax incomes of the working poor. See, e,g.,
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN. FREE TO CHOOSE 110-14. 226-28 (Avon Book; 1981) (1979).
For an extended discussion addressing concerns regarding unemployment, see Chang. supra note I. at
1181-85.
46 Set.: Louis Knplow & leven ShavelJ. Why rhe Legal Sy,\um is Less /:.]ficienr IIi(/n llie Income
Tax ill Redistrilmli,lg Income. 23 J. LEGAL STUD, 667.669 (1994); leven Shavell. A Note ()fl Efficiency
vs. Di.l'triburiona/ Equity in Legal RllleN/aking: . /wllid Distributional Equity Matter Gi,..,." Optimal
Income Taxation? 71 Ai\.1. Eco=",. REV. PAPERS & PKOC. 414 (I9g I).
47 Kaplow & Shavell. supra nole 46. al 667-68.
48 Chris William Sancbirico, Dtu:ollslrucri,18 rile New Efficiency Ratioll{de. 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1003, 1008 (2001); see Richard S, Markovils. Why Kaplow and Slwvell's "Dollble·DiJfO,1ioll Argu·
ment" Anicles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L, REV. Sit (2005): Christine Jolls. Behavioral'::collomics
Analysis of Redi.<lributive ugal Rules. 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998). This article will focus on Ihe
objections raised by Chris Sanchirico. Christine Jolls has raised other objections from the perspective of
behavioral cconomics. For an evaluation of the objeclions raised by Jails in !.he cOlltCXl of immigration
restrictions, see Howard F. Chang. Tile Disadvantages of Immigration Rcslrictiolls as a Policy 10 Im~
prove Income Distribution, 61 SMU L. Rev. 23. 34 (2008).
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Chris Sanchirico points out that in certain circumstance' we may have rea-
sons to believe that a particular legal rule is superior to redistribution
through income taxes. Nevertheless, the various objections raised by San-
chirico do not suggest that protectionist immigration restrictions are a better
response to income inequality than fiscal policies under existing conditions
in the United States.
B. Heterogeneous Individua.ls
Sanchirico notes that individual may be heterogeneous in ways that
make some legal rules superior to taxes because these two policy alterna-
tives may direct transfers from different parties and to different beneficiar-
ies'? Notc that r have suggested that, in the United States, we could
achieve redistribution more efficiently by expanding programs already in
use under the existing U.S. tax system. I do not suggest that we identify
workers displaced by immigrant competition in the labor market and target
ubsidic- to those individuals, as we direct trade "adjustment assistance" to
tho'e harr[ICd by import competition in goods markets.so As Raj Bhala
notes, trade adju tment programs have proven "nightmarishly complex"
and "ineffectual."sI A imilar program for workers displaced by immigrant
mpctilion would requirc a new bureaucracy and additional administrative
costS. 52 Instead, thc measurcs that [ propose would only modify existing
tax policies to ensure that immigration liberalization does not increa. e
overall after-tax income inequality.
These measurcs would not seek to compensate precisely every single
individual affected adversely by liberalization so that immigration reform
would make litcrally no one worse off. To insist that these reform effect
such a Pareto improvement over the status quo sets too high a hurdle for
reform. Such a rcquirement would prevcnt us from implementing virtually
any rcform in any public policy.
49 Sanchirico, slIpra nOie 48. al 1057-64; see Chris William S<lnchirico. 1'cues Versu.~ Legnl Rules
lIS Imrrumelltsjur Equi0': A More Eqlliwble View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797 (2000).
50 Sl'e JOliN J. JACKSON ET AL.. LEGAL PRonLE~1S OF INTERN;\TIONAL ECONOMIC RI~LATIONS
669-75 (4lh t.:d. 2(02) (discussing trade adjustment assistance programs); RAJ BHALA. IN'fERNATIONAL
TR.\J)b LA W 1580-89 (2d cd. 2000) (same).
51 Bh3la. supra note 50. at 1582,
52 j":'unhcnnore. if we compare the administrative costs of alternative policies, then we must rceo'l11
Ihal lhe enforcement of immigration restrictions has proven 10 be COSily. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY.
BACKFIRE AT THE BORDER: WHY ENFORCEMENT WrrHOUT LEGALIZATION CANNOT STOP tLLEGAL
I.MMIGI~ATION7·8 (2005); Alan O. Sykes, The We!jal'e Economics c{ Immigration Law: A Theorelical
Slirvey wilh (III AI/alysis of U.s. Policy, ill JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 158, 191 (W<lrren F. Schwartz ed.,
1995) (riming that "conSiderable resources arc devoted to . .. apprehension and deportation . .. along the
Mexican border and to the detection of ulldocumcnted workers in the workplace").
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1. Equity
Not only is it infeasible as a practical matter to replicate exactly the
redistribution produced by protectionism but it is also not desirable as a
normative matter. We can generally design progressive tax and transfer
policies so that they redistribute income on the basis of morally relevant
criteria, whereas the alternative of protectionism distributes its subsidy on a
morally arbitrary basis. Protectionism subsidizes the unskilled native who
happens to face immigrant competition in the labor market but not the simi-
larly unskilled native who does not. In this sense, protectionism is inferior
to tax and tran 'fer policies from the perspective of not only economic effi-
ciency but also horizontal equity.
Sanchirico, however, suggests that some legal rules may enable us to
target transfers in ways that taxes cannot and that are more appealing from
the perspective of distributive justice. For example, if immigration restric-
tions were to target transfers disproportionately to black natives rather than
white natives, we might regard this effect as desirable given the disadvan-
tages that blacks face relative to whites in our society.53 At the arne time,
legal constraints imposed by constitutional law in the United States may
prevent explicit discrimination in favor of blacks and against whites in tax
rates.
In fact, a recent study by George Borjas, Jeffrey Grogger, and Gordon
Hanson suggests that immigration drives down black employment rates to a
greater extent than white employment rates.54 Their study, however, indi-
cates that this effect derives only from a greater elasticity of labor supply
among blacks than among whites so that a given wage impact from immi-
gration has a greater employment effect among blacks. 55 Their results sug-
gest that immigration does not have a greater wage effect on black workers
than on white workers after they control for education and experience.
Given this evidence, even if we take all their results to be true, tax reforms
that yield the same after-tax wage for each income class of native workers
as protectionist immigration restrictions yield would be just as effective in
53 Some observers express concern about the impact of immigrmion on black workers in particu-
1::1.(. Su, e.g.. BORJAS. supra note 4. at 93-94; BR1CCS. supra note 6. al 213-15: Swain. j'upra nole 35. at
18Q-87.
54 See Borjas Cl al.. supra note 41, <Jt 37.
55 [d. (explaining thill their results suggest "the 1980-2000 immigrant influx had roughly similar
impacts on wages by race, but had a bigger impact on both employment rales and incarceralion r.lleS for
blacks"). Their proposed explanation for their results is that blacks shift more readily Oul of legitimate
employment and into criminal activity than whiles in the face of the same drop in wages. See id. at 17
(noting that "if the demand for labor in (he crime seclor is more elastic for blacks than for whites. immi-
gralion will have a larger negative impact on black market employment and a larger posit'ive impact on
black crime employment").
16 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS & POLICY [VOL. 5:1
preventing this adverse effect on black employment as the protectionist
alternativc.
Thus, the study by Borjas, Grogger, and Hanson provides no reason to
believe that protcctionist immigration restrictions provide an advantage
over the tax system from the standpoint of equity. Their results are better
under tood a a reason to adopt progressive tax reforms than as a reason to
restrict immigration. Protectionism still derives no apparent justification
from the fact that the transfers it accomplishes do not fall on precisely the
same individuals targeted by transfers through the tax system.
2. Economic Efficiency and Interacting Distortions
Sanchirico suggests that some legal rules may target transfers more ef-
ficiently than redistributive tax policies can. This suggestion might apply to
immigration restrictions if such policies happen to change the real wages of
those with the least elastic upply of labor. According to principles of op-
timal taxation, redistribution hould target workers with the least elastic
supply of labor so as to minimize the distortions in labor supply associated
with a given amount of redistribution. There seems to be no reason, how-
ever, to think that protectionism targets its transfers in a way that reduces
the distortions associated with those transfers.
Sanchirico also notes that, although redistribution through legal rules
may produce a second distortion in addition to the distortion produced by
redi.tribution itself, a double distortion may be less costly than a single
distortion because "[d]istortions may counteract one another.,,56 There
scems to be no rcason, however, to think that the distortions specific to pro-
tcctionist immigration restrictions mitigate the distortions in work incen-
tive associated with rcdistribution. Indeed, the empirical cvidence gives us
ample reason to think that protectionist immigration restrictions introduce
additional distortions that instead aggravate the distortion in work incen-
tives associated with redistribution.
a. Optimal Tax Theory and Working Women
Specifically, the costs of protectionist immigration rcstrictions in the
United States may fall disproportionately on working women, whose labor
supply is more elastic than that of men.57 The decision of women to par-
ticipate in the labor force is particularly sensitive to economic incentives
56 Sanchirico. supra notc 48. at 1017.
57 See EDWARD J. McCAFFERY. TAXING WOMEN 180-83 (1997) (surveying the empirical evi-
dence of labor supply elasticities for men and women).
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compared to the same decision for men.58 When taxation induces women to
stay home and out of the labor market, society bears the costs of the depre-
ciation of their labor market skills and of a less efficient allocation of labor
in the economy.59 Therefore, optimal tax principles suggest that redistribu-
tion should target male worker rather than female workers so as [0 achieve
a given quantity of redistribution with thc minimum distortion in labor sup-
ply.
According to optimal tax theory, we should tax women at lower rates
than men, given the greater deadweight loss that results from the taxation of
women. 6O Insofar as legal constraints-such as those imposed by constitu-
tional law in the United States-prevent explicit sex discrimination in tax
rates, other policies that achieve similar results in effect would increasc
social welfare. For example, favorable tax treatment or explicit subsidies
for child-care expenscs may reduce the distortion in female labor participa-
tion flowing from the taxation of women 61 This reduction in behavior dis-
tortion would allow us to accomplish either the same redistribution with
less deadweight loss or a more equal income distribution with the same
deadweight loss.
b. Immigration Restrictions and Working Women
When protectionist immigration restrictions reduce the supply of im-
migrant workers and thereby rai e the cost of relatively unskilled labor, the
result is preci. ely the opposite of what optimal tax theory recommends,
driving up the cost of services demandcd disproportionately by households
58 TIle decision to participate in the labor Illarkel is more sensitive lo economic incentives than the
choice of how many hours to work conditionrll on having accepted employment See James J.
Heckman. WIIllt Has Beell Learned Abolll LaborS/lPP/Y ill the Past Twenty Years? 83 AM. ECON. REV.
116. 117 (1993) ("Panicipation (or employment) decisions generally manifest greater responsiveness lO
wage and income variation than do hours-oF-work equations for workers."). A survey of the empirical
literature reveals that "the strongest empirical effects of w<lges :lnd nonlabor income on labor supply arc
10 be found at the extensive margin-at the margin ofcnlry and exit." Id. at 118.
59 See Janet C. Hunt ct aI., Ta:wtiol/ lilld the Wife's Use ofTime, 34 INDUS. & LAO. RGt. REV. 426,
432 (1981) (noting thai "higher marginal tax rates reduce the amount of Speciillizatioll in lhl: economy"
by reducillg the labor supplied by wives outside lh~ home. causing "a fall in rcal income," and that a
"rclil loss may occur in the fonn of human capital depreci3tion of wives because of reduced labor·time
mmchmcnt and lower hours of market work").
60 See HARVEY S. ROSEN. PUBLIC FINAN E 337 (3d cd. 1992) (noling that "ceonomClric siudics
suggest that the husband's supply of labor is considerably less elastic than that of the wife" and that
"(cjflicicncy could therefore be gained if lhe current lax law were modified to give husbands higher
marginal tax rates lhan wives"); Michael J. Boskin & Eyum Shcshinksi. Optimlll Tax Treatment of tile
Family: Mllrried Couples. 20 J. Pun. ECON. 281. 296 (1983) (estimating mat the optimal "tax rate on
husbands would be roughly twice that on wives").
61 See MCCAFFERY, s"pra notc 57. at 278 (nOling that "optimal tax·' principles suppon "a more
generous child-care deduction or credit").
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with working women. In the United States, for example, the National Re-
search Council ("NRC") ranked low-education occupations in terms of the
share of hours worked by immigrants. Among the top twenty uch occupa-
tions, the NRC listed the following: cooks, kitchen workcrs, bakers, and
others who work in food preparation; housekeepers, maids, and others who
clean private households; child-care workers; and waiters, waitresses, and
their assistants.62 Similarly, given the concern expressed by many restric-
tioni ts regarding low levels of education among Mexican immigrants in
the United States, George Borjas and Lawrence Katz rank occupations ac-
cording to the share of employment in the United States accounted for by
Mexican inunigrants in 2000. Among the top ten occupations in this rank-
ing, Borjas and Katz list cooks, gardeners, and those employed in private
households.63 Borjas reports that, in the United States in 1995, immigrant
workers were more than four times as likely as native workers to work in
private households.64 The NRC observed that "[t]he degree to which imlni-
grants d mjnate some of these fields is remarkable," conc1 uding that
"[t]hese services would not exist on the ame scale without immigrants, and
the main economic impact may well be in the form of lower prices.,,65
The NRC also calculated the share of the cost of different goods and
services that went to pay for immigrant labor. The NRC found that "[t]he
categories that have relatively high immigrant labor-cost shares include
household services (18.2%)" and "laundry, cleaning, and garment services
(10.9'11 ).,,66 The NRC also found that "[s]ingle (childless) males and cou-
ples in which both spou es work have the highe t fraction of expenditures
attributable to immigrant labor - 5.1 %," precisely "because these house-
holds spend a greater proportion of their income on services, in particular
household services and food consumption away from home, both expendi-
ture eategol;es with relatively high immigrant labor sharcs.,,67 The NRC
concluded thaI "those who would be expected to have less time to spend
in ide the household ... con ume fractionally higher proportions of com-
modities produced using relatively high proporti ns of immigrant Jabor.,,68
Thus, immigrant workers provide services, such as child care, house-
keeping, and food preparation, which are consumed by many households
that would olherwise rely on a woman staying om of the work force to sup-
ply these services at home. By reducing the supply and driving up the cost
of these services, protectionist restrictions on the immigration of relatively
62 See NRC. supra nOle 20, at 213-14 (Tahle 5.18).
63 See GeorgeJ. Borjas & Lawrence F. Katz. The Evo/wion offlre Mexicall·8om Workforce i1l the
United States. ill MEXICAN IMMIGRATIO:; TOTHE UNITED STATES 13.23 (George J. Borja' cd., 2007).
64 See BORJAS, .IIIpra note 4, at 80 ('rable 4·3).
65 NRC. SlIpra nOle 20. at 215.
66 /d. at 232.
67 Jd. • t233.34.
68 Jd. al 235.
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unskilled foreign workers impose an implicit tax on working women, in-
creasing their incentives to leave the labor force and the incentives of other
women to stay at home.69 By imposing the burden of redistribution dispro-
portionatcly on working women, protectionist immigration restrictions dis-
tort labor supply more than necessary, contrary to the teachings of optimal
tax theory.
Consider, for example, the effect of the cost of child care on labor
supply. Numerous studies confirm that mothers reduce their labor supply
as the price of child care rises. Patricia Anderson and Phillip Levine survey
the empirical evidence and conclude that "studies do virtually uniformJy
find a negative relationship between child care cost and maternal employ-
ment.,,70 Rachel Connelly also surveys thi evidence and repons "evidence
of a negative effect of child care costs on hours worked in the labor mar-
ket.,,71
The adversc effect of child care co t on maternal em~loyment seems
especiaIly large for households with the lowe t incomes. 2 These costs
have a di proportionate effect on the poor because a given increase in the
cost of child care represents a larger burden as a fraction of income for a
household with less income. Connelly reports that "[t]he percent of family
income devoted to child care increases as incomes decline.'o7J To avoid the
high coSt of child care, many mothers with low incomes choose to stay
home and out of the labor market.74 Tn this sense, when imm.igration re-
strictions increase the cost of child care, the implicit tax that they impose on
69 See WORLD BANK. supra note IS, at 50 (nOliog lhm "the beneficial effect of immignltion"
would include any "expansion in the supply of native labor [as more p:u-ents can afford child care and
workers have more time to devote to their jobs)" resulting from "reductions in the prices of services").
70 Patricia M. Anderson & Phillip B. Levine. Child Care lIml MOlhers' Employment DecisiQlIs, ill
FINDING JOBS: WORK AND WELfARE REfORM 420. 440 (David E. Card & Rebecca M. Blank cds..
2000): see Rachel Connelly. The Importam:e ojChiJd Care Costs to Wome,,'s Dec:ision Mtlking. ill TUE
ECONOMICS OF CHILD CARE 87, III (David M. BlilU cd.. 1991) (surveying the empirical evidence •.md
finding "general agreement Ihal higher costs of child care IC<leI to lower levels of 1:1bor force panicipa-
tion for both married and unmarried women"). ror a morc recent ~urvcy of this evidence. see D.\vid M.
Dlau. Child C(/f'i!. S/lluidy Programs. in MEANS-TeSTED TRANSI~EI'{ PROGRAMS IN Tllfi UNITED STATES
443.481-93 (Rnbel'! A. MoClitt cd .• 2003).
71 Connelly. supra nOlC 70. at 114.
72 See Anderson & Levine. suprll nOle 70. ill 438-40 (Table 10.5. showing ll'luhiple studies dem-
onslrating that lhe elasticity of employment wilh respect to the price of child c:!n: may differ across
groups. all of which show I:lrgcr elasticities for low-income groups).
73 Connelly. supra n te 70. at 95 ("pamilies who pay for care:' she tim.ls. "Willi ineome.~ of less
lhun $10.000 devoted more lhan 25% of family income to child care:' which "is ovcr 30% of the
mother's labor earnings."): see id. at 97 (reporting data in Table 3). See aLro Anderson & Levine, supra
note 70, at 454 ("The least skilled workers who use child care" pay "more for child care. even when the
youngcst child is of school age:' calculated "as a percentage of income.").
74 on-us. Anderson and Levine suggesl that "(tJhe lack of low-cost child care may be a crucial
dClcnninant of the employment decisions of the less skilled," whose polcntial 103rkcI wagel\ are more
likely to be outweighed by the costs of child care. Anderson & Levine, supra note 70, al420.
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households tends to be regressive, undercutting efforts to increase the real
income of the poor.
To some extent, a working mother can mitigate the costs of child care
by turning to a relative to care for her children, or in unusual case, by car-
ing for her children while at work. Indeed, David Slau reports that "[i]n
almost half of all primary child care arrangements for young children of
employcd mothers, the caregi ver is the mother, the father, or another rela-
tive.,,75 In fact, the lower the income of the household, the more likely the
mother is to turn to a relative for ehild care.76 In these case, the effect of
child care costs on labor supply takes a different form. Rather than reduc-
ing the mother's participation in the labor market, the costs of child care
inhibit the participation of the mother's relative, who stays home to provide
the needed child care. Thus, the existing empirical literature, which esti-
mates the effect of child care costs on maternal employment, actually un-
derstates the effect of these costs on labor supply, especially for famjlies
with low income.
Similarly, as Connelly observes, a working mother can mitigate the
costs of child care by choosing less expensive child care with "a lower level
or quality."n [n these cases, rather than distorting the decision to partici-
pate in the labor market, the high cost of child care distorts the choice of
quality. Less co:tly child care, Connelly notes, would allow mothers "to
choose high quality care fOI' their children" with a corresponding "positive
effect on their chiidren."7S Higher costs and a Ie 's attractive set of options
for child care, on the other hand, may persuade a mother to stay out of the
labor market.
Once we consider the cumulative effect of immigration restrictions on
the cost of all services consumed by households with working women, in-
cluding not only child care but also food preparation and housekeeping, the
total impact on female labor supply is likely to be even greater. Further-
more, the impact of these restrictions in costs may prove to be less progres-
sive than one might think, given that, as consumers, the poor as well as the
rich enjoy the benefits of immigrant labor. In fact, the NRC found that the
"consumption of immigrant-inten ive commodities is spread rather evenly
acro s different groups of consumers," albeit with somewhat greater bene-
fits going to "those with relatively high incomes" and "those with high lev-
els of education.,,79
75 BlUlI, supra nott: 70. at 460.
76 See id. at 461 ("'Loosely speaking. cenlcr and f<lmily day care an(1 babysillcrs appear 10 be
nonnal goods. substituted for rcJ~lti,'c care a~ income rises,"). In a similar vein. Anderson and Levine
report Ihat "the use of relative care drops sharply with molher's education." A.nderson & Levine. supra
note 70. at 429~ see id. at 454 (reporting that "children of !.he least skilled rnOlhcrs are about twicc as
likely as children or the most skilled to be cared for by a relalive"),
77 Connelly, supra notc 70. at 114.
78 Id.
79 NRC, supra nole 20, at 235.
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On the other hand, immigration restrictions may also encourage fe-
male participation in the labor market by increasing the wages that working
women may expect to receive. Recall, however, that we can replicate the
after-tax wages paid to native workers through the appropriatc adjustments
in income or payroll taxes. Therefore, optimal tax considerations would
favor restrictions on the immigration of relatively unskilled workcrs as a
device for redistribution only if these restrictions somehow increased the
wages of poor working women relative to poor working men. This immi-
gration might have such a disparate impact, for example, if labor market
are segregated by sex and these immigrant workers were predominantly
female rather than male. If these immigrant workers were therefore better
substitutes for native women in the labor force than for native men in the
labor force, then restrictions on the entry of those workers generally would
confer benefits on working women disproportionately.
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that ju. t the oppositc is
true: if there is any disparate impact of the immigration of relatively un-
skilled aliens on the wages of native workers, this impact is likely to be
more adverse for native male workers than for native female workers. A
recent study by the Urban Institute finds that, in the United States, mcn
dominate the low-wage immigrant labor force, while the low-wage nativc
labor force is mainly female. so Given this pattern, a typical influx ot' rela-
tively unskilled immigrants is likely to cause a larger percent increase in the
supply of low-wage male workers than in the supply of low-wage female
workers in the United States. If labor markets are segregated by sex, then
this influx would have a correspondingly greater adverse effect on the
wages of male native workers than on female native workers. In this sense,
restrictions imposed on this immigration are generally more likely to bene-
fit men than women. Furthermore, the Urban Institute also finds that,
among low-wage immigrant workers, "women ... are better educated than
their male counterparts."SI Insofar as immigration restrictions exclude rela-
tively unskilled workers based on education, these restrictions are more
likely to exclude men than women, with correspondingly greater benefits
80 See RANDY CAPI'S ET AL., A PROFILE OF HIE LOW-WAGE IMMIGRANT WORKI'ORCI3 I (2003).
http://www.urblln.org/UpJoadedPDF/310880Jowwagc_immig,,wklC.pdf (reporting thai 56% of the
luw-wage immigral1l labor force is male, when::.as 59% of the low·wage native labor rorc!,; i~ fl.:l\wlc).
111is pattern is even more pronount:ed among lhose immigralll workers who may be Ihose most lik~ly 10
take advantage of libcl'ali7.ed opportunities for legal immigration. The Urban Institute reports lhat only
"37% of low·wage undocumenlcd workers arc women," reflecting "very high labor·forcc participation
among undocumellled men and relatively low labor panicipalion among undocumented women," who
"are [.... 1' more likely to be married" and "have more children on average than nativc·bon1 women." Id. at
6.
81 Id. 3t 6 (reporting that 76% of "female low-wage immigrant workers hold at least i.l high school
diploma. comparcd with 66% of male low·wage immigrant workers," and are "also more likely to he
proficient ill English than foreign-born male workers: 59 versus 50%"),
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for male natives in the labor markel. 82 Thus, restrictions on the immigra-
tion of relatively unskilled immigrant workers not only burden working
women disproportionately as consumers but also seem likely to benefit
male natives disproportionately as workers.83
Given this disparate impact on households with working women, re-
distribution through protectionist immigration restrictions is inferior to the
tax alternative not only from the ·tandpoint of economic efficiency but also
from the perspective of the feminist who would like to remove artificial
obstacles to female participation in the labor force. 84 Protectionism in thi
context raises another hurdle for many women entering the labor market by
implicitly taxing working women and discriminating in favor of families
organized along more traditional lines. For the feminist opposed to public
policies that are biased in favor of traditional gender roles, the tendency of
protectionist immigration laws to keep women at horne should militate
against those laws and in favor of tran. fers through the tax system instead.
On the other hand, there may also be tho e conservatives who believe
that public policies that promote the traditional family, with women staying
at horne, increase social welfare.85 For example, these policies may produce
benefits for children, whose interests might not receive the consideration
82 Current immigration rcstrlC(lons in the Unilcd States ohen favor morc educated aliens for
imnllgr:.uion visas. See. e.g., U.S.C. § 1153(l')(2) (2000) (requiring either "rlt least :1 hIgh school
education Or its equivalent" or "at leasl 2 years of work experience in ::m occupation which requires aI
least 2 years of training or experience" for 3 "diversity" immigrant visa); id. § 1182(a)(4) (requiring
considcrmion of "cduc,ation and skills" in determining whclhcr an alien is "likely aI any time 10 becomc
:l public charge" and thus "inadmissible"). Similarly. Ihe point s)'stem proposed in the U.S. Senate in
2007 would have nwarded points to prospective imllligr:lnts based on education and proficiency in the
English langunge. See S. 1639, IIOlh Congo (2007); t\LE1NIKOFF ET ,\L. supra note 8. at 461.
83 111 an effon to raise the wagcs or female native workers in particular, we could targct femalc
aliens for exclusion. but insofar as labor markl:lS <lrc sl.:grcgalcd by sex, the r~ult in thc markel for
goods ancl services could be perverse. These aliens may provide many of the services consumed dispro-
portionately by households with working women.
84 A wclf3rist might objeel to these obstacles based on gender equily if the welfari~t bcl1cve:-o that
the following !WQ conditions hold. First, women arc worse off than men :IS a general malleI'. See
M AFFERY, !wpra note 57, al 237 (describing the SI:III\.~ quo 01; "n world in which [women arel di:-.pro-
porllomlh.:ly poor. marginal. unhappy. overworked. undiCrappreciatcd. and slressed"). Second. remale
participation il1lhc labor market improves the welfare' of women relative to men so that removing ubsta-
clcs 10 this p:mit.:ipmion would promotc a morc equitable distribution uf wdfare bctw~cn Ihe sexes. See
ill. ot 268 ("Many women really do wanl to work outside us well as inside the home-Illey want I.he
satisfaction. 5tlmubllion, prestige. engagement. and fin<lnci:tl rewards of pnid work, and they don't want
to spend all of their time in the often exhausting, frustrating. undemppreciated. and unpaid domestic
sphere."). According to Edwnrd McCaffery, for cxample, women "who stay at home full time wish rhat
Ihey could get out of the house more ... to share sOll1e of the joys of the worl(jng wf)ftd. 10 cJl.perience
more diversity in their lives. and [0 earn some money and independence." Id. at 212
85 Some observel1' believe "that trndilion...1 families wilh stay-at-home wives were good for soci-
elY, forchildl'en. for men. even for women." Id. at 166.
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that they deserve from parents.R6 Perhaps child care provided by a parent at
home increases human capital, raising children who will become more pro-
ductive workers as adults, thereby generating benefits for society as a
whole. These benefits may include positive externalities in the form of tax
revenue for the public treasury, which may be a social benefit neglected by
parents making private decisions regarding child care and participation in
the labor market.
In any event, I do not intend to entcr that dcbate hcrc, other than to
suggest that, even if we were to decide to promote the traditional family,
immigration restrictions would be a poor choice as an instrument with
which to do so. It would probably be more efficient to do so through the
tax system for the same reason that it would probably be more efficient to
transfer income from the rich to the poor through the tax system: inunigra-
tion restrictions needlessly destroy gains from trade in the labor market.
We can subsidize traditional families directly through the tax system with-
out the additional distortions in the labor market that are specific to immi-
gration restrictions. Given this observation, 1 will set aside the promotion
of the traditional family as a possible objective for immigration policy.
Instead, I focus on an equitable distribution of income as the policy objec-
tive and maintain the standard assumption that we would like to achieve the
desired income disuibution with as little distortion in labor supply as possi-
ble.
c. Immigration Restrictions Versus the Tax Alternative
How can we be sure that immigration restrictions are less efficient
than the current tax system in shifting income from the rich to the poor in
the United States? As Edward McCaffery has explained, the current lax
system in thc United States also includes several fcaturcs that tend to dis-
courage female participation in the labor market. Given these features, the
existing tax system causes more distortions than a system conforming to the
principles of optimal tax theory.
For example, McCaffery notes how the U.S. system of joint filing for
married couples discourages female participation in the workrorce87 Sup-
pose we refer to the spouse who earns less or is otherwise less committed to
the labor market as the "secondary earner" in the househol(l. ~s This spouse
86 Therefore. some may believe that it is "a good thing" if we encourage "parents to stay ttl home
with their children. , , because children benefit from being cared for <"It home." /d. al 126,201. To the
extent thaI this encouragement rakes the form of an implicit or explicit tax on Ihe Lise of professional
child care. however, the claim that this encouragement produces nct benefits for children seems dubiolls
because such Do tax reduces the wealth of many households with children.
87 See id, at 12-23.
88 ld.al21.
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is more often the wife rather than the husband.89 "For the most part,
women are second earners simply because they earn less than their hus-
bands," as McCaffery explains, noting that "[m]arried women make about
60 percent of what married men do.,,9o When contemplating entry into the
labor market, the secondary carner takes thc participation of thc primary
earner as given, and therefore often faces a higher marginal tax rate. In
many cases, thc income of the primary earner ha already pushed the
hou. ehold out of the lower tax brackets. The secondary earner does not
enjoy the low marginal tax rates applied to the income brought in by the
primary earner.
Thus, much of McCaffery's critique of the current tax system objects
to its tendency to extend equal treatment to hOLlscholds with the same total
income, whether that income is earned by one worker or two workers in the
family. He points out how the secondary earner does not produce the same
social security benefits91 or fringe benefit 92 that the primary carner does for
a family because the tax system fails to double these benefits when a sec-
ondary earner adds income to the household. [n essence, he observes that
the tax system must treat a hou ehold with a secondary earner better than a
household without one, even if these households have the same total in-
come, in order to give the secondary earner the same incentive to partici-
pate in the labor market that the primary earner faces.
[n thi· respect, restrictions on the immigration of relatively unskilled
workers are even worse than the tax alternative as an instrument for income
transfers. Whereas the tax system tends to treat the hou ehold with a sec-
ondary earner the same as the hou ehold without one, provided that the
households have the same total income, immigration restrictions tend to
treat the household with a secondary earner worse. This disparate impact
on households with working women implies that immigration restrictions
calise greater distortions than tax reforms with the same effect on income
distribution among natives would cause.
There is onc respect, however, in which the current tax system may
treat households with a secondary carner worse than those without: house-
work performed by a woman for her own household in her own home
avoids taxation whereas the government would tax the same work per-
formed by an employee or independent contract r that she hires as well a·
any income that she earn' in the labor market. 93 As McCaffery notes, this
feature of the tax system places a burden on working women and provides
an implicit exemption for the woman who stays at home and c10es her own
89 Jd. (noting Ihat "there is apllo be n secondary camt;r in most families. and it is overwhelmingly
likely to be the wife").
90 Id.
91 See id. at 94-96.
92 See id. at 126··29.
93 See id. •1 120·21.
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housework. Thus, the tax system may burden a household with a secondary
earner compared to a household with the same total income but without a
secondary earner insofar as it taxes the income earned by the worker per-
forming housework for compensation. The incidence of this tax falls at
least in part on the household employing that worker.94 Thus, th.is lax in-
creases the cost of going 10 the labor market for those services.
Nevertheless, restrictions on the immigration of relatively unskilled
workers are still likely to place a greater burden on households with secon-
dary earners than the tax alternative. Whereas restrictions on the immigra-
tion of relatively unskilled workers drive up the cost of services demanded
by households with secondary earners, progressive tax reforms with the
same impact on the distribution of income among natives are likely to re-
duce the cost of those services. After all, those tax reforms would cut taxes
on the least skilled natives. By cutting taxes on those natives most likely to
supply the services demanded by households with secondary earners, these
reforms would tend to bring down the cost of those services rather than
drive them up. Thus, despite the defects in the current tax system that dis-
courage female participation in the labor market, immigration restrictions
are likely to cause greater distortions than tax refonn producing lhe same
improvement in the distribution of income among natives.
The available empirical evidence bolsters confidence in this conclu-
sion. This evidence suggests that even immigration restrictions focuscd on
excluding relatively unskilled foreign workers would produce surprisingly
small benefits for the least skilled native workers because these immigrants
and natives are imperfect substitutes in the labor market, because immigra-
tion tends to increase the demand for labor, and because immigration re-
strictions increase prices paid by the poor as well as the rich. These disad-
vantages make immigration restrictions relatively ineffectual as instruments
for redistribution compared to income taxes, which are not subject to lhese
disadvantages. Given the small adverse effects of immigration and the
small number of native workers who find their wages reduced by the influx
of immigrant labor, a correspondingly small increase in the progressi vity of
94 Although public finance economists commonly assume thaI the incidence of income :)t1d pay~
roll taxes falls on the employee and nOt on the employer. the elasticity of labor supply would havl: I() he
zero rather than positive for the employee to bear the full tax burden. Zero elasticity of labor supply
may be a reasonable approximation for male workers or for hours of work conditional on employment
blH it is not a reasonable assumption for labor supply in general. See Heckman, supra note 58. Ill. J 18
(surveying the empirical evidence and concluding that. although labor supply elasticities may hc close to
zero "for hours-of-work equations, , , estimated for tho~'e who (Ire working:' these "elasticitic5 .arc
dcli.nilely not zero" if we look "at the extensive margin - at the margin of entry and exit"). Further-
more, if we nevcnheless assume that the employer bears none of this lax burden. lhen Ihis assumption
implies thal the tax system treats the household with a secondary worker no worse than lite household
with the same total income but with no secondary worker. In this case, immigration restriclions impose
a greater burden on the household with a secondary worker than the tax system does and are therefore
less efficient as a n1cans to Iransfer income from the rich (0 the poor,
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our taxes would suffice to compensate the few who lose real income as a
result of competition from immigrant workers. If only a small change in
tax rates is required to replicate the redistribution effected by protectionist
immigration restrictions, then this change would cause only correspond-
ingly small distortions in the labor market. By the same token, protectionist
immigration restrictions can improve the welfare of the least skilled natives
by only a small amount compared with the costs that those restrictions
would impose on other natives.
Finally, there is no principled reason why we cannot reform the tax
system to conform more closely to optimal tax principles.95 U we can in-
crease tax rates to effect more redistribution, then we can also make the tax
system more efficient by eliminating those features that needlessly burden
working women in particular. The costly features of the current tax system
noted by McCaffery are neither immutable nor inherent in the notion of
taxation. Indeed, McCaffery proposes various reforms that would eliminate
or mitigate the problems that he identifies. For example, he suggests that
we allow spouses to file separately so that the secondary earner in a house-
hold would face the same marginal tax rates that the primary earner doe
when deciding whether to enter the labor market.96 He also suggests favor-
able tax treatment for the secondary earner's income or for child care ex-
penses as possible res~onses to the failure to tax work done at home for
one's own household.9 Ultimately, the ideal for which we should strive is
redistribution through an optimal tax system rather than through protection-
ist immigration restrictions.
We could also make immigration restrictions more efficient by tailor-
ing them more narrowly so as to reduce the burden that they place on
95 Moreover. if we are taking the current tax system as given, then the dislonions caused by pro-
tectionist immigr31ion restrictions urc even mOre costly than lhey would be in the absence of that sys-
tem. In general. the morc distorted behavior is. the morc costly further dislonions in that bch.wior
would be. As we move further away from the social optimum, the marginal cost of the distortion in-
creases. Therefore. to the extent chat women or men work less than would be economically efficient.
any policy that aggravatcs that distortion is especially costly. We should keep in mind that this observa·
tion would be lfUC of not only further increases in tax ratcs but also the use of protectionist immigration
rcsuictions in addition to the existing tax systcm. 'Illis interaction between immigrntion restrictions and
income taxes also implies that more progre.~sive laxes arc likely to becomc socially optimal as we liber-
alize our ilOllligrj,tion policies. Libcralizcd immigrJtjon would reduce the distortions in labor supply
caused by restrictive poUcics. which would rcduce the social COStS of morc redislribution through the tax
system. 'Inu5, if we wish to reduce income inequality, thcn it will be appropriate to make tax rates morc
progressivc as we case immigration restrictions.
96 See MCCAFFERY. supra notc 57. at 278 (suggesting "a system of separate filing under the
income tax" for spouses). He also suggests that we solve "(tJhe problem with fringe benefits ... by
allowing secondary earners to opt out of certain coverage and get ca h instead." ld. at 134. As a re-
sponse to the problem with social security benefits. he suggests a "sccondary-eamer exemption" from
social security taxes. id. at 102. or "earnings sharing" between spouses. id. at 103.
97 See id. at 133-34; id. at 278 (suggesting "greatcr secondary·eamer relief' and "a more gcncrous
child-care deduction or credit").
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households with working women. For example, we could restrict the im-
migration of relatively unskilled workers but create exceptions for workers
entering the United States to accept employment in food preparation,
housekeeping, or child care. Insofar as labor markets are segregated by sex,
however, these exceptions might also have the perverse effect of driving
down the wages of women relative to men, for example, if native women
work disproportionately in child care or housekeeping. Such an effect
would tend to undercut the advantage that we would seek through such ex-
ceptions, which would be to reduce the burden that redi. tributive policies
place on working women.
Furthermore, these exceptions would simultaneously make our immi-
gration restriction less effective at protecting the least killed native work-
ers from foreign competition. Native workers who remained in those par-
ticular occupations would find immigration driving down their real wages.
Those native workers who instead turn from those occupations to seek other
lines of work requiring modest levels of skill would tend to drive down real
wages for similarly skilled natives employed in those ther lines of work.
Given these effects, the impact of immigration policy on income distribu-
tion would be greatly reduced, and it remains likely that we could achieve
the same modest impact at lower cost through the tax system. After all,
even if we tailored immigration restrictions so as to eliminate the disparate
impact that they have on households with working women, these immigra-
tion restrictions would still destroy gains from trade in the labor market,
whereas progressive tax reforms would nor.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the merits, protectionist immigration restrictions have little to rec-
ommend themselves as a policy to improve income distribution among na-
tives, given the option of superior tax alternatives. My economic analysis
indicates that tax and transfer policies are more efficient than immigration
restrictions as instruments for raising the after-lax incomes of the lea.. t
skilled native workers. Policies to protect these worker. from immigrant
competition in the labor market are no better at promoting distributive jus-
tice among natives and are likely to impose a greater economic burden on
natives in the country of immigration than the tax alternative. These immi-
gration restrictions are especially costly given the disproportionate burden
that they impose on households with working women, a burden that dis-
courages female participation in the labor force. This burden runs contrary
to the teachings of optimal tax theory and introduces excessive distortions
in the labor market because the supply of female labor is more elastic than
the supply of male labor. Thus, the be t response to concerns about the
effect of immigration on the distribution of income among natives is to in-
crease the progressivity of the tax system.
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The preceding discussion of the effects of inunlgration on native
workers has assumed that the welfare of immigrants is of no concern to us.
Thus, thi discussion has ignored the benefits that the immigrants them-
selves enjoy Crom their access to our labor market. This nativist assump-
tion also implies that we would exclude immigrants from the same access to
transfer programs that natives enjoy so as to ensure that inunigrants do not
impose a net cost on natives through the public sector.98 Re trietions on
immigrant access to public benefits can ensure that natives continue to en-
joy the economic gains from employing immigrant workers without the
fiscal burden that full access to transfers would impo e on the public treas-
ury.??
We can relax this nativist assumption and instead assume that our ob-
jectives renect concern for the welfare of immigrants. This shift in our
welfare objectives would imply greater immigrant access to public benefits
than the nativist would favor, which in turn might well imply that the least
skilled immigrants impose a net burden on natives. Once we drop the na-
tivist assumption, however, we may consider this reduction in the welfare
of natives a burden worth bearing. After all, we would only expand immi-
grant acce s to transfer programs if we thought the benetit to immigrants
outweighed the cost to natives in the fit'st place.
If concern for the welfare of immigrants militates in favor of more lib-
eral access to transfer programs, then it should also militate in favor of
more liberal admissions policies. If we care about the welfare of the aliens
whose immigration is under consideration, then we should respond by lib-
eralizing our immigration lawswil Indeed, we might also care about the
welfa.re of aliens abroad who are not seeking admission to our country,
which should lead us to consider the impact of our immigration policies on
those aliens as well.
Once we gi ve any weight at all to the itllerests of those born outside
our borders, then we have yet another reason to liberalize immigration.
98 Congress has in fact restricted imrnigrant access to a broad range of publi~ belleJits. See 8
U.S.C. §§ 1611·1613 (2000); Chung. ~'l/pm note 1, at 1178-80 (de:-;cnbing various restrictions ('Ill alien
access to public benefits in the United Stales).
99 See Chang. supra nQle 9, at 313 ("Otherwi:.;e, transfers to immigr:lnls could di!\siratll the: eco-
numic gaills [0 natives.").
100 til my prior work, 1have argued against thcOIies of distributive justice that extend <":Ollcern to
illllrugrants only arler WI: have decided to udmit them. "if our admission policies arc based only on the
interests of mHives ..md immigrants already here. thell we would refuse to admit pOOl' immigrants be-
cause we w uld anticipate the public benefits lhat they would conSUllle and the liscal burden that they
would impose on incumbent resid"'lltS." Howard F. Chang. "nu: Immigralion P(l"(jdox: Poverty, Dis-
triburive Justice, and Liberal Ega/iwriat/ism. 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759, 769 (2003). "This moral stance
... produces lin anomaly" because the exclusion of poor aliens implies that. "by agreeing to obligations
waf distributive justice toward thr.m if admiued, W~ hnnn them," /d, I suggest that we should avoid mis
"immigration paradox" by adopting "a cosmopolitan perspective that extends equal conccn\ r all indj·
viduals, including aliens." Id. at 772.
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Once we recognize any moral obligation to reduce poverty abroad and to
reduce global inequality, we must confront the significant economic harm
we inflict on those we exclude undcr our restrictive immigration laws. 1ol
Given adverse effects of restrictive immigration policies on the poor
abroad, considerations of global justice militate in favor of progressive fis-
cal policies and against protectionism as a method of addressing any con-
cerns regarding the distribUiion of income among native.
101 I have argued elsewhere in favor of liberal immigralion policics bm,cd OJ} <.I Cosnlopolil:m thl,.\OI'Y
of global distributive justice that extends equal concern 10 all individuals worldwide. See id, af 769-73:
Howard F. Chang. The Economics 0/ IntemmionallLlI)or Migration alld the Cast!/or Global Distribu·
tive Justice in Liberal Political Theory. 41 CORNELl. INT'L LJ. 1, 11-25 (2008): see a/so Gillian K.
Hadlield. Just Borders: Nomuuive Ecorlomie,s fwd Immigration Law. in JU~"TICE IN (MMIGRATION.
supra note 52. Qt 201. 205 (arguing that "rilf economist are to panicipatc in the nonnative debate over
inunignnion ... !.here can be no stnning point other than a global social welfare function" because: only
that perspective "avoids Ihe question begging raised by a nalional SOCkll welfare function"),
